



Version of attached le:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached le:
Unknown
Citation for published item:
Begon, Jessica (2018) 'Robeyns, Ingrid. Wellbeing, freedom and social justice : the capability approach
re-examined. Cambridge : Open Book, 2017. Pp. 268. 41.23(cloth);22.87 (paper).', Ethics., 129 (1). pp.
135-139.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1086/698739
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© 2018 by The University of Chicago.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
https://dro.dur.ac.uk
I would like to conclude by pointing to a final facet of transitions—a feature
that has to do with the peculiar moral psychology of those living through these
great upheavals and is intimately connected to the questions of authority and fra-
gility that Murphy raises. Citizens living under transitional regimes typically want
their governments to accomplish myriad, mutually incompatible results. These in-
clude (but are not limited to) the institution of the rule of law, the punishment of
past perpetrators, the establishment of a historical record of past wrongs, the pub-
lic acknowledgment of victims, the restoration of safety and political stability, the
achievement of administrative competence, the creation of jobs, the garnering of
international legitimacy, and the attraction of foreign investments. These wishes
are all dearly held, all legitimate, and yet, often, incompatible: trials are good at in-
stituting the rule of law but less effective at acknowledging victims’ suffering; admin-
istrative competence may require hiring rather than punishing past perpetrators;
similarly, political stability and safety may require amnestying rather than punish-
ing those associated with the previous regime; the historical record does not always
benefit from the exclusionary tendency of the rules of evidence governing war crime
trials. In short, another feature of transitional states—in addition to the four Mur-
phy mentions—is that their citizens have deeply held, morally legitimate political
expectations that contradict each other. How should a transitional government re-
spond to its deeply conflicted citizenry? How do such conflicts impact a govern-
ment’s ability to deliver a just social transformation? Should such a government,
in order to preserve its popular support, gauge which of these desires takes prece-
dence among its citizens? How feasible is such gauging, given that these desires are
likely to be in flux? On the other hand, can a transitional government, considering
its fragility and the resulting unique need for public support, afford to ignore those
political preferences? We have, it seems, arrived at the same question from a differ-
ent direction: can democratization be accomplished democratically under condi-
tions of extreme fragility? Or do transitional settings raise a special case of the prob-
lem of dirty hands—a case perhaps more forgivable than those that arise in settled
contexts—because of the unique combination of the enormity of the stakes, the in-
stability, and the absence of norms to guide political actors?
Nir Eisikovits
University of Massachusetts Boston
Robeyns, Ingrid. Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice: The Capability Approach Re-
examined.
Cambridge: Open Book, 2017. Pp. 268. $41.23 (cloth); $22.87 (paper).
“What are people really able to do and what kind of person are they able to be?”
(9). This is the core focus of the capability approach, and it is clear why it has had
so much appeal in a variety of disciplines and on a range of questions. Indeed, it
has been used as a framework to study public health, technology, environmental
policy, disability, and education, among others (17–18). Formost political philos-
ophers, however, the capability approach is primarily considered in just one of its
many guises: as an approach to distributive justice. Specifically, it is seen as one
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possible answer to the “equality of what?” question, or as an alternative distri-
buendum of justice. Deeming persons to be entitled to a bundle of resources
without taking account of what they are able to do with them may seem unsatis-
factory, as does focusing on the level of welfare this generates given howmuch this
may be influenced by potentially unjust background conditions, contextual fac-
tors, and (potentially malformed) individual expectations. The appeal of the ca-
pability approach, therefore, lies in its focus on individuals’ genuine opportunities
(or capabilities) to perform functionings (to do or be certain things), regardless of
howmany resources this requires or howmuch welfare it generates. That is, distrib-
utive justice should be concerned with the kinds of lives people are able to lead
and with ensuring that individuals have equal or sufficient opportunities to pursue
certain courses of action (traveling, or voting, or caring for a child) or to achieve
certain states of being (being healthy, or sheltered, or literate).
The contribution of capability theorists to this debate has been important
and influential. Further, given the origin of the capability approach in Amartya
Sen’s 1979 Tanner lecture (entitled “Equality of What?”) and the dominance of
Martha Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach (as a partial theory of jus-
tice), it is unsurprising that it is this iteration of the approach to which most phil-
osophical attention has been paid. Yet this is not all the capability approach is,
and Robeyns’s excellent book forcefully disputes this narrow understanding of
it. She argues that the capability approach is not a “precise theory” of justice or
of anything else, but “a flexible and multipurpose framework” (24) which has
been used to form the basis of various specific capability theories.
In the first of three substantive chapters, Robeyns gives a “helicopter view” of
her modular understanding of the capability approach, outlining the elements
that she deems essential to any capability theory and those that are to some de-
gree optional. In the subsequent chapters she clarifies and expands on various
elements of the capability approach and, finally, provides an overview of the crit-
icisms that have been raised against it and assesses how damaging they are. Rob-
eyns’s primary goal here is not to develop and defend her own capability theory,
but to “tame the proliferation of scholarship about the capability approach” (3).
The overriding theme throughout is the central claim that the capability ap-
proach is a framework, not a theory, and that as such “the capability approach can-
not, by its very nature, answer all the questions that should instead be put to par-
ticular capability theories” (30). The capability approach, then, is not a theory of
justice, or an account of human development, or an approach to education pol-
icy, but specific capability theories might be any of these things, and many more.
Robeyns provides a clear and accessible account of the core debates that have
long plagued the capability approach literature. She explains concisely the con-
tributions that the capability approach hasmade in themany fields to which it has
been applied, especially focusing on work in philosophy, economics, and political
science. She ably demonstrates the instances in which scholars working in these
different disciplines may be talking past each other, provides guidance on how
these parallel literatures could be brought into clearer dialogue, and shows what
there is to be gained from amore interdisciplinary approach. This book will prove
a hugely useful resource for both scholars and students, whether they are new to
the capability approach or versed in only one subset of the literature. I have no
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doubt that this book will advance the study of the capability approach, clarify
many conceptual and terminological misunderstandings, and, perhaps most im-
portantly, defuse much misplaced criticism. Many critiques of the capability ap-
proach claim to have definitively identified the flaws in this approach when all
they have really done is demonstrate problems with some particular capability
theory, as Robeyns repeatedly shows.
There is, then, verymuch to admire. However, while the book no doubt fills a
significant gap in the existing literature and does important work in bringing the
many diverse threads of the capability approach together, this zoomed-out, “he-
licopter” perspective is not only the book’s strength but also the source of its lim-
itations. There are two related worries here: first, the speed with which Robeyns
dispatches the various topics under discussion; and second, the focus on the ca-
pability approach, without a commitment to a capability theory, can sometimes
seem evasive. This move allows Robeyns to neutralize many potential problems
and criticisms, which simply “make no sense against the capability approach in gen-
eral” (19). Yet it does not provide a satisfactory resolution to these putative criti-
cisms, to which specific capability theories still need to provide an answer. These
worries may not be entirely fair: Robeyns’s goal, after all, is not to defend a capabil-
ity theory but to clarify the conceptual terrain and lay out the criteria a future capa-
bility theory should meet. Nonetheless, there are times when a clearer sense of
her own commitments and vision would be welcome.
Robeyns’s main contribution is her modular understanding of the capability
approach. Its goal is to demonstrate both the flexibility and the limitations of the
capability framework. This is “the peculiar nature of the capability approach”: on
the one hand, it is “not exactly a precise theory,” yet it also is “not something that
can be anything one likes it to be” (75). Robeyns identifies three sets of modules:
those which are compulsory (A), those which are compulsory with optional con-
tent (B), and those which are contingent on other choices or fully optional (C).
First, the “A-modules” are features that are necessary for a theory to be a gen-
uine capability theory, as opposed to a hybrid account. These include the require-
ment that functionings and capabilities are core concepts in the approach (A1),
that they form the evaluative space (A5), and that they are understood to be value
neutral (A2). The things people can do or be and the real freedom to achieve
them need not be good: some may be bad (the freedom to rape one’s partner,
to pollute the atmosphere, or to be illiterate), and some will be difficult to cate-
gorize. The status of some of these modules is more ambiguous. For example, A6
is the requirement that “functionings and/or capabilities are not necessarily the only el-
ements of ultimate value” (53). Given that this allows for some flexibility regarding
whether and which other dimensions of value are adopted, this may seem to fit
more naturally as a B-module. Similarly, A3 requires acknowledging the existence
of personal, social, and environmental conversion factors, which determine “how
much functioning one can get out of a resource” (45). Again, given the various
ways conversion factors can be understood, this might seem like another module
that allows scope for choice regarding content. As such, it may be harder to draw
firm lines between the modules than Robeyns implies.
The “B-modules” are “non-optional modules with optional content” (37).
This means that a capability theory must address the issue raised by each of the
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B-modules but canmake various choices about their approach to it. For example,
a capability theory must have an account of human diversity (B3), agency (B4),
and structural constraints (B5) but need not be committed to one particular ac-
count. Equally, a capability theory must select which capabilities or functionings
matter (B2) and whether the focus will be on the achievement of functionings, or
access to capabilities, or both (B6), but the capability approach does not dictate
the choices that should bemade.Muchwill dependon the decisionmade inmod-
ule B1 regarding the purpose, scope, and reach of the capability theory: for exam-
ple, achieved functionings may be the appropriate metric when measuring an
intervention designed to improve access to work and social networks among in-
dividuals with cognitive impairments, while individuals’ access to opportunities
may be more appropriate for an idealized theory of justice.
Finally, the “C-modules” are either contingent on a choice made in a B-
module or else fully optional. These comprise the additional ontological and ex-
planatory theories adopted (C1); how capabilities and functionings are priori-
tized, weighed, and aggregated (C2); the methods used for any empirical analysis
(C3); and any additional normative principles or concerns (C4). For example,
some capability theorists may insist that the relative weight of capabilities and
functionings should depend on the outcome of a process of democratic decision-
making (e.g., Sen), while othersmay weight themaccording to the degree to which
they promote some further value, such as individual agency (e.g., Rutger Claassen).
The approach taken may depend on choices made in the B-modules, such as the
purpose of the approach, or the account of agency adopted.
Indeed, the answers to many of the questions Robeyns considers in the
course of the book will depend on the goal and application of the specific capa-
bility theory. For example, should we promote functionings or capabilities? Are
capabilities best understood as freedoms? What notion of well-being is used in
the capability approach? Should we commit to a specific list of capabilities, and
which should be included? Is the capability approach a liberal theory? Again, spe-
cific capability theories can take different views on these central questions, and
most criticisms have purchase only against some specific capability theory. The
capability approach is open onmany issues: it is not a liberal theory, or libertarian,
or perfectionist; it is not committed to promoting specific capabilities, or to pro-
moting only capabilities and not functionings; it is not committed to a specific
account of well-being, or to a particular empirical approach. As such, it can side-
step much critical comment. However, this does not solve capability theorists’
problems: it demonstrates that critics should replace “the capability approach”
with “this capability theory,” but the criticisms will still have bite unless there is
a capability theory that can avoid these worries yet still achieve the conceptual,
descriptive, explanatory, evaluative, and normative (27–28) goals at which differ-
ent applications of the capability approach aim.
Robeyns’s discussion of Nussbaum’s work illustrates the difficulty of identify-
ing the appropriate target for criticism and the limitations of appealing to the dis-
tinction between capability approach and capability theory. Despite Nussbaum’s
own claims to the contrary, then, her account is not one of two capability ap-
proaches, alongside Sen’s—after all, “there is only one capability approach” (79).
Rather, it is a capability theory. Given this, some of Robeyn’s criticisms of Nuss-
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baum seem misplaced. For example, in a section considering whether the capa-
bility approach should only address the government, Robeyns points out that
while Nussbaum sees it as essential to the capability approach “that it ascribes
an urgent task to government and public policy” (179), there may be cases in which
the capability approach could prove a useful tool though “the government is not
involved at all” (180).
How deep does this criticism go? On the one hand, it may simply be a more
specific instance of the complaint that Nussbaum wrongly names her capability
theory “the capability approach.” This is well grounded, but it hardly seems nec-
essary to point out all the times Nussbaum’s specific commitments are inessential
to the broad capability framework. Even if supererogatory capability or function-
ing promotion is sometimes (or often) appropriately pursued by private groups
or individuals, Nussbaum could still be right to suggest that the primary duty to
meet the demands of justice falls on governments (with, of course, the caveat that
if a government does not fulfill their obligations, secondary duties may fall on
other actors). Thus, showing that the government is not the “primary agent of
change” (183) in every application of the capability approach does not determine
whether Nussbaum is right to make this claim in her capability theory of justice.
On the other hand, it might be this more specific claim—that governments
are the primary agents of justice—which Robeyns is critiquing. This is not a
debate I will enter here. However, it is worth noting, first, that Nussbaum does
acknowledge the importance and impact of individual and community-led ini-
tiatives in promoting capabilities in numerous places in her work. Second,
Robeyns’s examples of capability promotion in which the government ought
not to play a role—a community improving the quality of life in their neighbor-
hood and parents deciding where to send their child to school—do not seem so
obviously free of state involvement as she assumes. At the very least, it is surely ap-
propriate for the state to determine the scope of acceptable choices in these do-
mains: schools that do not teach basic literacy or numeracy, engage in corporal
punishment, or attempt to indoctrinate children into some comprehensive doc-
trine may all be subject to legitimate state involvement, for example. However,
the point is not to determine whether Robeyns is right about the appropriate
scope of government action. Rather, it is to emphasize the importance of being
clear about the nature of such critiques and to stress that just as criticisms of ca-
pability theories may not have bite against the capability approach, so is it unfair
to criticize capability theories for making claims inessential to the capability ap-
proach.
I cannot, and so have not attempted to, provide a précis of all the topics
Robeyns covers, or highlight all of the insights she provides. I will only conclude
by saying that this is an impressive book, as well as a hugely useful resource, and
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